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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1960 ' s a debate took place , both in the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand , on the merits of introducing a Bill of Rights as a 
means of protecting fundamental civil and political rights . I n New 
Zeal and the Constitutional Society for the Promotion of Economic Freedom 
and Justice in New Zealand (Inc) presented a petition to Par l iament in 1960 
praying for a written constitution. This was followed by the inclusion 
in the National Part y ' s 1960 Manifesto of a promise to introduce a Bil l 
of Rights similar to tha t adopted by the Canadian Parliament . In 1961 
the Society s ubmitted to Parliament a draft Constitution , i ncluding a 
Bill of Rights enforced by the Supreme Court. 
After consideration by the Public Petitions Committee, which made no 
recommendation, the matter lapsed until 1963 . (l) 
In 1963 the Minister of Justice of the National Government introduced 
to Parliament a Bil l of Rights designed to give statutory protec tion for 
fundamental rights and freedoms already existing. This the National 
Government saw as fulfilling its 1960 Manifesto promise . The Bill was 
referred to a recess Parliamentary Committee which reported back to 
Parliament in 1964 with the recomme ndation that the New Zealand Bill of 
(2) 
Rights be not allowed to proceed . As an issue of public debate , 
the merits or demerits of introducting a Bill of Rights has since disappeared 
from political consciousness in New Zealand, although legal commentators 
still addressed the issue . (
3
) 
The debate in the United Kingdom has however continued , if somewhat 
sporadically. . 1 d . . kl ·11 f . h (
4 ) Michae Zan er in his boo et A Bi o _ Rig ts traces 
the history of the written debate on Bills of Rights du ring the 1960 ' s , 
while over the next few years the issue of a Bill of Rights was raised in 
(5) 
Parliament on severa l different occasions. 
UW UBRARY 
In 1971 the then Attorney -
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General, Mr Sam Silkin, moved the second reading of a Protection of 
Human Rights Bill. This Bill would establish a UK Commission of 
Human Rights with power to investigate, report and recommend but no 
power to enforce - a role corresponding to that of the New Zealand Human 
Rights Commission. Unfortunately the debate did not proceed as the 
House was counted out for lack of 40 members present. It remained 
for Sir Leslie Scarman, chairman of the English Law Commission, to re-
open the debate with his Hamlyn Lectures in December of 1974. (
6
) 
Sir Leslie saw English law at a crisis point, under pressure from the 
international human rights movement, evidenced by the General Assembly's 
. . . (7) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention 
. (8) 
on Human Rights. This pressure needed to be accomodated into the 
prevailing legal system. However, the constitutional principle of 
legislative sovereignty ofte. found the Courts helpless in the face 
f II th '11 h f 
O ht d d O d O d 
O b f l' I ( 
9 ) o ... e wi owever rig ene an preJu ice it may e o Par iament.' 
As the concept of fundamental and inviolable human rights could not 
withstand the determined onslaught of the 1 
. l (10) egis ature 
Means, therefore have to be found whereby (1) there is 
incorporated into English law a declaration of such rights, 
(2) these rights are protected against all encroachments, 
including the power of the state, even when that power is 
exerted by a representative legislative institution such as 
Parliament. 
Sir Leslie's solution called for entrenched or fundamental laws 
protected by a Bill of Rights. This call was echoed by Lord Hailsham 
T
. (11) 
in a series of articles in The imes which prompted Professor 0. Hood 
Phillips Q.C., in a letter to The Times to promote a Bill of Rights to 
. . . (12) 
which Parliament would be subJect. Notwithstanding the eminence 
of these advocates, the concept of a Bill of Rights has been subject to 
. (13) 
criticism, notably that of Lord Lloyd of Hampstead and Lord Diplock. 
The criticism engendered by the proposal of a Bill of Rights can be 
separated into two main spheres. 
The first sphere concerns the problems of introducing a Bill of 
Rights into the existing constitutional framework, the second sphere 
is concerned with the substantive impact of a Bill of Rights once 
introduced. This paper will deal with an aspect of that second sphere 
- namely the role of the judiciary. 
As pointed out earlier the ultimate goal of the proponents is a 
Bill of Rights which would be enforceable by the individual through 
the Courts. This goal raises issues concerning the suitability of 
judges, trained in the English legal system, as arbiters of the new 
legal regime. Many of the arguments raised against the efficacy of a 
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Bill of Rights hinge upon a perception of judges as inadequate to the 
task of implementing the principles of a Bill of Rights, especially where 
. (14) 
such principles are often couched in broad language. Concurrent 
with this perception is a fear that once the judiciary assume the power 
to strike down inconsistent legislation, then Executive interest in the 
appointment of judges will grow. Similarly involvement in controversial 
issues and a more open acknowledgement of the role of judges as law-
makers which a Bill of Rights would induce, may lead to some erosion 
of the reputation for impartiality which the English judiciary holds. 
Where opponents of a Bill of Rights argue on the basis of the 
unsuitability of the judges, the argument is based on the following 
1) That the judges are an unrepresentative conservative and possibly 
. (15) 
biased group. As non-elected persons they are not answerable to 
the will of the electorate. Thus the argument runs that a Bill of 
Rights, placed in the hands of such a group, would become the means of 
restricting civil liberties. This then becomes a question of who decides 
important political issues, with whom should the ultimate responsibility 
lie, with the elected representatives and the broader political process or 
with the judges? 
An example of the pressure to which the judiciary can be subjected 
comes from Papua New Guinea. In Premdas v. The Independent State of 
(16) 
Papua New Guinea Re Rooney a case concerning the legality of the 
revocation of an entry permit of a University teacher who also worked 
for a Government Minister; the Minister for Justice accused the Court 
of jeapodising its independence and neutrality by interferring in a matter 
which was considered to be the sole prerogative of the Government. The 
Minister then called upon the Judiciary "to make a greater effort to use 
their discretion effectively to develop the National legal system in the 
. (17) 
context of a proud and growing National consciousness. " 
The Chief Justice reacted by stating that he and his brother Justices 
were affronted by the remarks which could well constitute contempt of Court. 
The Chief Justice then stated that the Court would not ''accept directions 
from or pressure by the Minister or anyone else ," and requested the Minister 
to withdraw and apologise. 
On 20 July 1979 the Chief Justice revealed the existence of the 
correspondence and the l etters were published in the only daily newspaper. 
This action angered the Minister who stated that she had no confidence 
in the judges and later refused to retract her stateme nt. P. political 
wrangle then ensued with both the Deputy Prime Minister and the Prime 
Minister supporting Mrs Rooney, while the Opposition called for the 
Prime Minister's resisnation and the Government was criticised by leading 
lawyers. After a private prosecution was dropped the Public Prosecutor 
charged Mrs Rooney with three counts of contempt of the Supreme Court. 
A majority found her guilcy on all three counts and sentenced her to eight 
· · (lB) · 11 1 f h months imprisonment. The Rooney case is an exce_. ent examp e o t e 
e..:ise with which the judiciary can become embroiled in party politics ar,d 
the alacrity of political parties in capitalising on the situaticn . 
The pressures are all the more great where, as in Papua New Guinea, 
the judiciary are empowered by the Constitution to strike down 
. . 1 . 1 . (19) inconsistent egis ation. 
2) The question whether reliance should be placed upon the 
judiciary to stand fast against the will of a frightened or prejudiced 
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legislature . The House of Lords' decision in Liversidge v. Anderson 
(20) 
stands as a stark warning of the acquiesence of the judiciary. 
Similarly the United States Supreme Court has also retreated in the 
face of an emergency and popular feeling, holding in Korematsu v. 
. (21) . 
United States that an order issued by the Commanding General of 
the Western defence command excluding persons of Japanese descent from 
residing in the State of California and substantial portions of Oregon, 
Washington and Arizona, was valid. 
3) Finally, commentators question whether judges' training in legal 
analysis really equips them to face the problems of interpreting 
a Bill of Rights. A Bill of Rights can sometimes involve statements 
of broad principle. Judges trained in the English system, it is said, 
adhere to rules of construction that require words to be given their 
literal meaning, even if unfortunate results accrue. Such techniques 
absolve the judge of the responsibility for the social impact of such 
decisions. The problem is compounded by a consistent refusal to allow 
any reference to Parliamentary debates, or other evidence of a social 
or economic nature as aids to interpretation and which may shed light 
upon the ramifications of a particular decision. The traditionalist 
literal approach to interpreting Bills of Right may circumvent the very 
purpose of such enactments. 
The focus of the remainder of this paper will test the validity of 
these criticisms by an examination of some of the Privy Council 
decisions involving Bills of Rights emanating from Commonwealth countries 
that have gained independence since the 1960's. In the intervening 20 
years the Privy Council has gained considerable experience having dealt 
6 
with nearly 30 cases which have raised constitutional issues from 
these countries. Lord Diplock, in particular, has delivered the 
Board's decision in eleven of the cases, six of which were appeals 
from Trinidad and Tobago. This represents a development of expertise 
and allows the debate to move beyond the generalities of the 1960's, 
although as yet, there has been no sustained discussion of the cases 
(22) 
by United Kingdom commentators. 
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INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS 
1. Preliminary Obstacles and Judicial Avoidance 
The most important power the judiciary wield under a written constitution 
is that of deciding the constitutionality of legislative acts. 
However, there exist a variety of possible obstacles before this 
point may be reached. Some obstacles may occur at the commencement of 
the legal process where a claimant may face pro~edural barriers or be 
denied standing. Other obstacles may come in the form of judicial 
avoidance techniques such as the application of a "presumption of 
constitutionality" to legislative Acts and an unwillingness to decide 
constitutional questions unless directly in issue. 
(23) 
The question of procedure arose in Jaundoo v. A.G. of Guyana 
where the Privy Council considered the implications of the term "to 
apply to the High Court for redress," a wording common to many other 
new Commonwealth constitutions. This being the result of the common 
origin of the constitutions drawing heavily upon the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 
structure of the Nigerian constitution. The term was not a term of art 
when the Constitution was made in 1961 and was not therefore descriptive 
of any existing procedure for enforcing legal rights. 
(24) 
The words were 
in their Lordships' view ... wide enough to cover the 
use by an applicant of any form of procedure by which 
the High Court can be approached to invoke the exercise 
of any of its powers ... The clear intention of the 
Constitution that a person who alleges that his funda-
mental rights are threatened should have unhindered access 
to the High r ourt is not to be defeated by any failure of 
Parliament ... to make specific provisions as to how that 
access is to be gained. 
Since neither Parliament nor the Supreme Court had exercised their 
power to make provisions governing applications to the Court for redress 
Mrs Jaundoo's originating motion, though not a method by which proceedings 
are initiated to obtain a remedy by way of judgment in a civil action, 
8 
was appropriate to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court. 
What Jaundoo illustrates is that the new constitutions have conferred 
upon the High Courts under those constitutions new jurisdiction in the 
area of fundamental rights. As stated earlier the judiciary have the 
power to strike down inconsistent legislation but it is up to the individual
 
to apply for redress for any harm done under an unconstitutional law. 
Procedural forms should not be allowed to circumvent the exercise of the 
citizen's right to redress and this their Lordships have recognised. 
(25) 
In Collymore v. Attorney-General a case concerning the 
constitutional validity of the Industrial Stabilisation Act 1965 which had 
imposed a system of compulsory arbitration; the issue of standing arose. 
Under the original Act, section 10(2) authorised a public officer to enter 
upon the business premises of any "employer, trade union or other 
organisation". This, the appellants claimed was an infringement o
f 
section l(c) of the Constitution, which assured the right of the individual 
to respect for his private and family life. In the Court of Appeal 
this 
contention was rejected. The appellants had no standing because, the
 
Chief Justice said, section 6 of the Constitution permitted complaints 
only "in relation to them" and neither appellant was "an employer, trade 
union or other organisation." Although obiter (because the Act h
ad 
since been amended removing the power to enter the premises of any 
trade union) their Lordships thought "this may be too narrow a ground 





trade union was an unincorporated society and therefore each individual 
member may be affected by the power to enter union premises. 
9 
. (27) 
Attorney-General v. Antigua Times presented the Privy Council with 
. h (28) the issue w ether "person' in the redress section of the Constitution 
applied to artificial or legal persons as well as natural persons. Citing 
the history of the Antiguan Constitution which derived much of its 
wording from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental freedoms, their Lordships noted that the European 
Convention applied, in some of its articles, to artificial persons. 
Their Lordships then examined Australian and American decisions, 
in particular the Supreme Court of the United States' decisions 
on the fourteenth amendment to the American Constitution. In Grosjean 
(29) . 
v. American Press Co Inc. the Court held a corporation to be a "person" 
. h' h f t h d t d . h 1· 1 . 1 d (JO) wit in t e our eent amen men an in Wee ing Stee Corporation v. Gan er 
Douglas and Black JJ. said that it had been implicit in court decisions 
since 1886 that a corporation was a person within the amendment. 
As these decisions were not decisive their Lordships then examined the 
wording of the ~ntiqua constitution itself. Although some sections of 
the Constitution clearly could not apply to corporations others equally 
clearly could. Section 6 of the Constitution was clearly applicable being 
a protection against compulsory acquisition of property. Subsection (1) 
read : 
No property of any description shall be compulsorily taken 
possession of, and no interest in or rights over property 
of any description shall be compulsorily acquired ... 
If bodies corporate were to be excluded then the section would have to be 
read as if it contained the words "belonging to a natural person" as 
corning after "property." Similarly if bodies corporate were not entitled 
to apply for redress then other anomalies would aris~ for example if an 
individual formed a company then the business would have no constitutional 
protection. The protection for freedom of expression would only apply 
to individuals and not to newspapers owned by companies. For these 
reasons their Lordships concluded that "person" included artificial legal 
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persons which thus gave Antigua Times entitlement to initiate 
proceedings. 
Although the Privy Council has been liberal in its decisions on 
standing and procedure it is interesting to note however, that in a 
recent case Harrikisson v. A.G. 
(31) 
the Privy Council struck a note 
of caution. Harrikisson had claimed that his compulsory transfer within 
teaching posts was a contravention of his rights under section l of the 
Trinidad and Tobago Constitution. This conterttion their Lordships 
emphatically rejected. The idea that every failure of an organ of 
government or public authority to comply with the law, necessarily meant 
the contravention of a right or freedom guaranteed by the constitution 
. ( 32) 
was fallacious. The mere allegation of a contravention of a 
. ( 3 3) 
human right or fundamental freedom 
is not of itself sufficient to entitle the applicant 
to invoke the jdrisdictj.on of the Court ... if it is 
apparent that the allegation is frivolous or vexatious 
or an abuse of the process of the court ... 
Their Lordships also sternly warned against the dimunition that will 
attend the important safeguards of rights and freedoms in the Constitution 
if the right to apply for redress",,, is allowed to be misused as a 
general substitute for the normal procedures for invoking judicial 
d 
, , , , II (34) 
control of a ministrative action. 
The Privy Council has also been cautious when confronted by 
challenges to legislative Acts; the approach to questions of the 
constitutionality of legislative Acts is usually characterised by 
great circumspection. The Judicial Committee will usually avoid 
pronouncing upon the constitutionality of any question unless it is 
( 35) 
necessary so to do in order to decide the case. 
For example in Akar v. A.G. of Sierra Leone(
36
) the Privy Council de-
clined to decide whether, in the event that an Act depriving Akar of 
citizenship was foun0 valid, the Act could have retrospective effect. 
Th . L d I . d. d h h · bl · · · ( 
3 7 ) eir or s1ips i owever ca~vass t e possi e issues arising. 
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Similarly in Attorney-General v. Antigua Times (3S) the constitutionality 
of a provision requiring a grant of a licence signed by the Secretary to 
the Cabinet before publishing a newspaper was not decided because the 
respondent was deemed under the Act, to hold the licence required. 
The Privy Council also acts under another restraint in deciding the 
constitutionality of legislative acts. The first is a principle of 
construction that involves applying a presumpt~on of constitutionality 
h f h l . l t h f d. · h · (
39 ) tote measure o t e egis a ure. Te onus o 1sprov1ng t e presumption 
l.:ies upon the person challenging the legislation, but the presumption is 
rebuttable. "Parliament cannot evade a constitutional restriction by 
a colour able device." (4o ) 
In Antigua Times the Constitution provided limits for the fundamental 
rights and freedoms granted. The particular right in the case was 
freedom of expression which included "the freedom to hold opinions and 
receive and impart ideas and information without interference, and 
freedom from interference with his correspondence and other means of 
communication". (4il 
However, this right was limited by subsection 2 of section 10 which 
stated 
Nothing contained in or done under the authority 
of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or 
in contravention of this section to the extent that the 
law in question makes provision (a) that is reasonably 
required - (i) in the interests of defence, public safety, 
public order, public morality or public health ... 
The legislation which was being attacked had introduced three new 
requirements in regard to publishing newspapers in Antigua. The first, 
a requirement for a licence signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet 
before publishing, did not arise on the facts and their Lordships were 
concerned with the second and third requirement - an annual licence fee 
of $600 (42) and a surety of $10,000. 
For their Lordships the issue was whether this requirement could 
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come within the limitation of section 10(2) of the Constitution as being 
reasonably required for one of the purposes specified. If the limitation 
applied then, although the licence may be regarded as a hindrance to the 
enjoyment of freedom of expression, the Act could not be treated as 
contravening the constitution. 
The requirement for a licence fee was characterised by the Privy 
Council as a tax. Revenue was required to be raised in "the interests 
of defence and for securing public safety, public order, public morality 
and public health." Thus the issue became whether or not the tax was 
"reasonably required" to raise revenue for these purposes. It is at 
this juncture that the presumption of constitutionality assumes great 
importance. 
In some cases, an examination of the Act itself will show whether or 
not it was reasonably required but in other situations this will not be so. 
In this situation "the proper approach to the question is to presume, 
until the contrary appears or is shown, that all Acts passed by the 
. (43) 
Parliament of Antigua were reasonably required". 
(44) 
As Margaret De Merieux points out in an article in Public Law, 
"reasonably required" relates to the state purpose and does not require 
a balancing of the state purpose against the right being infringed. 
The implications of this mean that the Privy Council is confined to 
determining whether the legislation is "reasonable to achieve the interest 
or purpose stated in section 10(2) without setting the attainment of 
these purposes against the background of the right given." (4 sl When 
this is combined with a presumption of constitutionality the burden then 
falls upon the challenger to show that the enactment is not "reasonably 
required." Given that "in the interest of" is a phrase of wide extent 
the presumption operates so as to make the challenger•s task almost 
impossible. The combination of the wording of the limiting clause and 
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the presumption mean that the constitutional right may not have much 
real protection. In their Lordships' opinion the presumption was not 
rebutted, the licence fee was not shown to be so manifestly excessive as 
to lead to the conclusion that the statutory provision was so arbitrary 
as to not involve revenue gathering. Similarly the second Act which 
required a $10,000 surety for any libel action to be deposited with 
the Accountant General was held to be "reasonably required" for the 
purpose of protecting the rights and reputations of others and thus, 
by virtue of section 10(2) of the constitution, not in contravention 
of the constitution. The imposition of this requirement put Antigua 
Times out of business. 
By way of contrast, the presumption of constitutionality does not 
have such deleterious effects where the constitution "1 6 ) adds to the 
limitation section the words 
and except so far as that provision or, as the case may 
be, thing done under the authority therefore is shown not 
to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. 
This formulation requires the Courts to examine the legislation in 
question to see whether even if reasonably required, the limitation 
could be reasonably justifiable in a d e mocratic society. 
How the Courts will acquit themselves when confronted by this question 
will depend in part upon their attitude towards the nature of constitutions 
and the Bills of Rights they contain; and the statutory language contained 
within those constitutions. Both will operate to shape the scope of the 
protection given to the individual by Bills of Rights. The decisions 
made by the Privy Council will allow an appreciation to be made of the 
response of the judiciary. 
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2. Judicial Attitudes and Statutory Limitations 
In countries that have found themselves with written constitutions 
the function of constructing the constitution is of vital importance. 
Under a written constitution the problems of interpreting statutes 
are magnified by the additional need to decide whether a particular 
statute conforms with the constitutional provisions. When it is alleged 
that some provision in the constitution has been violated, it is the 
role of the judiciary to pronounce upon such allegations. This role 
involves the judiciary in much more than the mere interpretation of the 
words in a particular provision. The judicial pronouncements on the 
meaning of a constitution become part of the fundamental and supreme 
law laid down in the constitution. This is because in most written 
constitutions, provisions considered most important will be entrenched 
and thus a judicial decision may not be overridden by an ordinary 
amending Act. These changes may be difficult to achieve and changes 
may have to await a reassessment of the provision by the Court. This 
is not likely to be a quick process if the American experience is any 
guide. 
The judiciary then have thrust upon them a creative and formative 
role of wide legal and political significance. As Chief Justice John 
. (47) 
Marshall stated in the famous American case of Marbury v. Madison 
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the 
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and 
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other 
the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a 
law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law 
and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that 
the court must either decide that case conformable to the 
law, disregarding the constitution; or conformable to the 
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine 
which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is the 
very essence of judicial duty. 
Since most of the Constitutions under review provide, with certain 
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exceptions, that any law inconsistant with the Constitution, the 
constitution shall prevail and the other law be wholly or partially 
invalid, it logically follows that the power to construe the constitution 
and to determine the legality of those other laws adheres to the 
judiciary. 
As a consequence the attitudes that the judiciary bring with them 
to this task, are of prime importance. If the fears of the opponents 
of Bills of Rights are real, then narrow and literal interpretations 
of the constitutions and Bills of Rights in particular may have a 
detrimental effect upon the protection of civil liberties. As seen 
in the first part of this paper the Privy Council has not allowed questions 
of locus standi, and procedure to inhibit individuals from claiming 
redress for infringement of their fundamental rights. It now remains 
to be seen whether the understanding of the nature of a constitution 
this shows by the Privy Council is reflected in their attitudes towards 
interpreting these constitutions and to upholding fundamental rights. 
The constitutions of the new Commonwealth owe much of their 
origins to the European Convention of Human Rights. Provisions relat
ing 
to humans rights were inserted in to the Nigerian Independence 
Constitution of 1957 and similar provisions have been incorporated 
into the constitutions of the newly independent Commonwealth States. 
Because of this origin Bills of Rights in the new constitutions are not 
written in absolute terms. Those Bills of Rights are also su
bject to 
two statutory devices for limiting the freedoms thus granted. The 
first device is the use of a savings clause, which acts to save the 
existing law from the scope of the new provision. Thus if a right 
was lawfully prescribed under pre-existing law anything done under the 
authority of such a law would not be held in contravention of the 
new provisions. Therefore existing law may in fact define th
e limits 
of the rights granted in the constitution. The second devic~ is to 
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provide limits within the stated rights. Such limitations may, 
for example, provide that new laws may contravene the constitutionally 
guaranteed right where they are reasonably justified for a number of 
stated purposes. In none of the Commonwealth constitutions under 
consideration are Bills of Rights formulated in the absolute terms of the 
First Amendment to the American Constitution. All contain one or 
both of the above-mentioned devices. 
The question of the operation of savings clauses received definitive 
treatment in the important decision of Maharaj v. A.G. of Trinidad and 
(48) 
Tobago. The appellant, a barrister engaged in a case in the High 
Court, had been committed to prison for seven days for contempt on the 
order of the judge. The appellant applied ex parte by notice of motion 
to the High Court under section 3 of the Constitution claiming redress 
for the contravention of his Constitutional right not to be deprived of 
h . 1 · d f 1 (
49 ) is iberty save by ue process o aw. 
The High Court dismissed the motion and the appellant served his 
term of imprisonment. The appellant then appealed to the Court of 
Appeal against the decision of the High Court and also obtained leave 
to appeal to the Privy Council against the original committal order. The 
Privy Council quashed the order on the grounds of a failure to observe 
natural justice occasioned by the failure of the judge to explain the 
nature of the contemptuous behaviour thus preventing the appellant from 
tendering an explanation or excuse. Later the Court of Appeal dismissed 
the appellant's appeal from the High Court's decision on the ground that 
the failure to observe natural justice did not contravene a right 
protected by section 1 of the Constitution. The appellant appealed 
to the Privy Council. The question posed for the Privy Council was 
whether the failure to observe natural justice constituted a deprivation 
of liberty otherwise than by due process of law, within the meaning of 
section l(a) of the Constitution, for which the appellant was entitled 
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to redress under section 6. 
Lord Diplock (who delivered the majority decision) began by setting 
out the structure and presumptions which underlie the Fundamental Rights 
Chapter of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago and the corresponding 
chapters in other similar constitutions. 
. . . (50) 
Citing earlier cases Lord 
Diplock reiterated that these chapters proceed upon the presumption that the 
fundamental rights which they cover were as at independence already secured 
to the people by existing law. Such laws were not to be scrutinised to 
see whether they conformed to the precise terms of the protective provisions; 
the object of the protective provisions was to ensure that future enact-
ments in any area that the Chapters cover do not derogate from the rights 
h . h h · d' ·d 1 d h · · f f h · · (
5 l) w ic t e in ivi ua possesse at t e coming into orce o t e Constitution. 
The provisions of Chapter I of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution 
confirmed this presumption. Section 1 declared the natural human rights 
and fundamental freedoms "to have existed and shall continue to exist" 
while Section 3(1) declared that sections 1 and 2 would not apply to any 
law in force at the commencement of the Constitution. What section 3 
achieves is to debar the individual from claiming that anything "don e to 
him that is authorised by a law in force immediately before ... [the 
commencement of the constitution] abrogates, abridges or infringes any of 
the rights or freedoms recognised and declared in section 1 or particularised 
in section 2. 11 (
52
) However, section 3 does not legitimise any conduct 
unlawful under pre-existing law which contravenes any of the rights and 
freedoms set out in section 1 of the Chapter. This is because section 6, 
which deals with remedies, is not subject to section 3. 
Section 6 of the Constitution is very wide in its terms. For any 
interference with a right or freedom declared by section 1 that would 
not have been lawful under pre-existing law " section 6 creates a new right 
on the part of the victim of the interference to claim a remedy for it 
described as 'redress' 
II ( 53) 
In their Lordships' clear view the 
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protection granted by the Constitution was against contravention by 
the State or other public authority with coercive powers. For some of 
the rights and freedoms described there already was at the time of the 
Constitution an existing remedy. But where the rights or freedoms 
existed de facto,such as section l(e) "The right to join political parties 
and express political views," and were "not protected against abrogation 
or infringement by any legal remedy before the Constitution came into 
effect [were] since that date given protection which is enforceable de 
jure under section 6(1)"(
54
) As section 6(1) is expressed to be 
"without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter 
which is lawfully available" the clear intention, their Lordships stated, 
"is to create a new remedy whether there was already some other existing 
(55) 
remedy or not." 
Therefore it followed that whether or not the appellant's rights 
under section 1 of the Constitution had been contravened, depended upon 
whether the judge's order was lawful under any law in force before the 
commencement Df the Constitution. At the commencement of the Constitution 
contempt of court was governed by the common law which required the specific 
offence charged to be distinctly stated and an opportunity be given to 
answer. 
(56) 
As the judge's order was unlawful, as a breach of this 
requirement, the appellant's rights under section l(a) had been contra-
vened although under pre-existing law the only remedy available would have 
been an appeal to the Privy Council, by special leave to have the order 
set aside, section 6 would provide a remedy for which monetary compensation 
. (57) 
would provide an appropriate redress. 
The case was then remitted to the High Court with a direction to 
assess the amount of monetary compensation. 
Maharaj is an important development in the protection of fundamental 
rights and freedoms. The Privy Council by recognising the width of the 
section providing for redress against contravention of these rights has 
extended the citizen's remedies beyond those known at common law. 
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Although previously no action could be taken against a superior 
. (58) 
court judge or the State for alleged wrongful actions a citizen 
can now claim against the State for what has been done in the exercise 
of the judicial power of the State. This new liability "is a 
liability of the State itself ... not of the judge himself"(S
9
) and 
has been newly created by the redress provisions of the Constitution. 
In addition certain rights not previously recognised at common law have 
now been given protection which is enforceable under the Constitution. 
Th e Constitutional right to the due p rocess of law unde r Se ction l(a) 
may prove a fertile ground for developing new rights and freedoms. 
Where the second device of providing limitations within the stated 
rights is used, the Courts are then often forced into the realms of 
policy and value judgments on the legislation under review may have to be 
made. 
Whether or not the Judiciary can avoid a value judgrnent about the 
legislation attacked will in large measure depend upon the different types 
of constitutional language at issue. In some circumstances, such as 
(60) 
in Collymore the Court will only be required to make a narrower 
judgment. Collymore involved the Court in deciding whether "freedom of 
association" contained in the Constitution included the freedom to 
bargain collectively and the freedom to strike. Similarly in Government 
. . . . (61) . . d 
of Malaysia v. Selangor Pilots Association the Privy Council ha to 
decide whether a law providing for all licensed pilots to be employed by 
the Port Authority amounted to deprivation of property and thus was 
protected by the adequate compensation provision of Article B of the 
Constitution. But where the language used requires the Courts to decide 
issues of "reasonable justifiability" then the Courts will be forced 
into a judgment on the policy efficacy or fairness of a particular piece 
of legislation. 
Two examples of how the Privy Council handle this responsibility 
. (62) 
are provided by the cases Akar v. A.G. of Sierra Leone and A.G. of St. 
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Christopher Nevis and Anguilla v. Reynoldsf
63
) Akar required the 
Privy Council to pronounce upon the constitutionality of an Act which 
would limit citizenship to those of negro African descent. The 
Constitution of Sierra Leone provided by section 1(1) that "every person 
who, having been born in ... Sierra Leone, was on the twenty-sixth day of 
April, 1961, a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British 
protected person shall become a citizen of Sierra Leone on the twenty-
seventh day of April, 1961." The alleged amendment purported to insert 
the words "of negro African descent" after the words "every person". 
(64) 
This added qualification their Lordships categorized as essentially a racial 
one and as such it offended against the letter and flouted the spirit of 
h 
. . (65) 
t e Constitution. 
. . (66) . . . . . 
Section 23 of the Constitution gave protection from discrimination 
on the grounds of race. As subsection 1 of section 23 was direct and 
prohibitive stating that "no law shall make any provision which is 
discriminatory," any provision which offended was therefore invalid. 
However, section 23 was subject to certain exceptions contained in 
subsection 4 and in particular subsection 4(f). If the exception was 
applicable then the general prohibition against discrimination in subsection 
1 did not apply. Subsection 4 (as far as relevant) states : 
(4) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any 
law so far as that law makes provision ... 
(f) whereby persons of any such description as is mentioned 
in subsection (3) of this section may be subjected to any 
disability or restriction or may be accorded any privilege 
or advantage which, having regard to its nature and to special 
circumstances pertaining to those persons or to persons of any 
other such description, is reasonably justifiable in a dem-
ocratic society. 
Did the provisions of subsection 4(f) save Act 12 from the operation 
of subsection l? Immediately before the passing of Act 12 the appellent 
had Sierra Leone citizenship. If the Act was valid then because neither 
his father nor grandfather could be described as "negroes" of African 
descent his citizenship would be removed. It was therefore necessary 
to consider "whether the disability or restriction of deprivation of 
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citizenship is something which 'having regard to its nature and special 
circumstances pertaining to' the appellant and those similarly placed is 
'reasonably justifiable' in a democratic 
. (67) 
society." 
Their Lordships emphatically rejected the notion that a disability 
imposed by reason of race could by its nature be "reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society." The Board then observed that for the Act to be 
saved by subsection 4(f) not only must "the disability be of itself of a 
nature that makes it reasonably justifiable but there must also be 
'special circumstances 1 pertaining to the persons subjected to the 
disability which make the legislation reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society." 
(68) 
The only "special circumstances" pertaining to the appellant 
was the fact that his father and grandfather were not of African descent. 
As their Lordships rightly pointed out if section 23 itself prohibited laws 
treating persons differently because of differences of race, then it was 
impossible that differences of race alone could constitute "special 
circumstances". These "special circumstances" would have to be in 
addition to differences of race. The Act was declared ultra vires the 
Constitution and therefore null and void. 
This decision is indeed a praiseworthy example of the judiciary 
refusing to bow to the legislature. The approach of the majority is to 
be contrasted with the dissent of Lord Guest, who accused the majority of 
looking behind the face of the statute to its purpose. His Lordship 
maintained that the courts can only as a matter of construction decide 
whether an Act is or is not within the powers of the Constitution. Courts 
in interpreting Constitutions should, he warned, tread "warily and with 
great circumspection. 11 (
69
) A democratic society, his Lordship stated 
must have control over the qualifications for membership in that society. 
Therefore the Act which affected a disability as regards citizenship 
was "reasonably justifiable". His Lordship was not prepared to look 
at the purpose of the legislation even when the racial disqualification 
was plain upon the face of the Act. 
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Reynolds involved the Privy Council in deciding the question 
whether regulations made under a State of Emergency legitimised the 
detention of a retired police inspector in conditions that were humiliating 
and unsanitary. The detention order was made under the Emergency Powers 
Regulations 1967 which were in turn promulgated under section 3(1) of the 
Order-in-Council of 1959. The Constitution of St. Christopher, Nevis 
and Anguilla had come into effect on February 27, 1967. It provided 
that no person should be deprived of personal liberty save as authorised 
by law (section 3(1)) and gave a right of compensation for unlawful 
detention (section 3(6)). But section 14 provided : 
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of a law 
enacted by the legislature shall be held to be inconsistent 
with or in contravention of section 3 or section 13 of this 
Constitution to the extent that the law authorises the 
taking during any period of public emergency of measures that 
are reasonably justifiable for dealing with the situation 
that exists in [the state] during that period. 
Section 103(1) required: 
The existing laws shall as from the commencement of this 
Constitution, be construed with such modifications, 
adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be 
necessary to bring them into conformity with ... this 
Constitution 
The Privy Council were firmly of the opinion that Leeward Islands 
(Emergency Powers) Order in Council 1959 was an existing law immediately 
before the commencement of the Constitution. Therefore the Order in 
Council had to be construed in accordance with Section 103(1) and in 
light of section 14 of the Constitution. Whereas previously section 3(1) 
of the Order had given "an authority absolute discretion, and indeed 
the power of a dictator, to arrest and detain anyone", section 14 allowed 
"a law to be enacted conferring power to arrest and detain only if it was 
(70) 
reasonably justifiable to exercise such power." Their Lordships 
did not perceive any difficulty in construing the Order in Council by 
modification,adaption, qualification, and exceptions so as to bring it into 
conformity with Section 14 of the Constitution. 
The Order in Council so reconstructed read : 
The Governor of a state may, during a period of public 
emergency in that state, make such laws for securing the 
public safety or defence of the state or the maintenance 
of public order or for maintaining supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community to the extent that 
those laws authorise the taking of measures that are 
reasonably justifiable for dealing with the situation 
that exists in the state during any such period of public 
emergency. 
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This reconstruction also necessitated that the Emergency Powers 
Regulations made under the Order in Council be adapted. The regulation 
now meant : 
if the Governor is satisfied upon reasonable grounds that any 
person has recently been concerned in acts prejudicial to the 
public safety or to public order ... and that by reason thereof 
it is reasonably justifiable and necessary to exercise control 
over him, he may make an order against that person directing that 
he be detained. 
Their Lordships next considered whether, under the reconstructed 
regulation there existed reasonable grounds for supposing that 
the plaintiff had been concerned in acts prejudicial to public safety 
and order and that by reason thereof it was reasonably justifiable 
and necessary to detain him. 
During the plaintiff's imprisonment he had been handed a written 
statement which purported to specify in detail the grounds on which he 
was detained, as required by section 15 of the Constitution. The 
notice was vague and ambiguous and did not inform him of the grounds 
. (71) 
of detention . It seemed plain to their Lordships "that the 
irresistible inference to be drawn from the notice is that there were 
. . . . . . (72) 
no grounds, far less any justifiable grounds for detaining the plaintiff~ 
Accordingly their Lordships found the detention order invalid and that the 
plaintiff was unlawfully detained and ordered that damages of $18 , 000 be 
paid. 
Although it can be seen from these decisions that the Privy Council 
has responded well to the demands placed upon it by allegations of 
infringement of fundamental rights, such has not always been the case. 
LAW LIBRARY 
In the past a combination of traditional attitudes towards interpreting 
legal instruments and statutory limitations within the instruments, led to 
very narrow and restrictive decisions. 
One of the earliest Privy Council decisions in the period under 
. (73) consideration came in Runyowa v.~ The accused was charged with 
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attempting to set fire to a residential dwelling in contravention of section 
37(1) of the Southern Rhodesia Law and Order (Maintenance) Act 1960. 
A conviction under this section carried a mandatory death sentence for 
persons (other than pregnant women) over the age of sixteen. On the 
appeal a n ewr.ointwas raised that section 37(1) contravened section 60 of 
the 1961 Southern Rhodesian Constitution. This section provides that : 
(1) No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman 
or degrading punishment or other treatment. 
(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any 
written law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of this section to the extent that the law in 
question authorises the doing of anything by way of punish-
ment or other treatment which might lawfully have been in 
Southern Rhodesia immediately before the appointed day. 
The argument advanced by the appellant required an examination of the 
meaning, in its context, of "punishment". "Punishment' in section 60 (1), 
it was submitted, meant the infliction of some penalty proportional to the 
offence committed. A punishment that was out of proportion to that 
deserved by the commission of the offence was "inhuman" and contravened 
. (1) f h 't . ( 74 ) section 60 o t e Consti ution. In relation to this it was 
submitted that subsection (3) of Section 60 should operate to save only 
punishments which could have been imposed prior to the commencement of 
the Constitution in relation to a similar offence. The death penalty . for 
arson was amended by the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act after the 
coming into effect of the Constitution. (
7
S) Thus the issue raised 
required their Lordships to decide whether the Constitution prohibited not 
only inhuman or degrading modes of punishment but those that were inappropriate 
or excessive. 
Their Lordships rejected these contentions holding that "the 
ban that is imposed is upon any such type or mode or description of 
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. (76) 
punishment as is inhuman or degrading" Subsection (3) of section 
60 was construed as saving any mode of punishment authorised by any 
written law in effect prior to the commencement of the Constitution. 
The effect of this construction was to limit the application of section 
60(1) to newly devised inhuman treatments. Punishments of an existing 
type would survive, either for new or existing crimes. As the death 
penalty was not considered inhuman or degrading per se, the appellant's 
argument failed. 
To arrive at this conclusion the Board considered the matter to be 
purely a question of the construction of the words in their context. (
77
) 
Accepting the appellant's argument would, they believed, involve reading 
into the section words that were not there. The Board appealed to section 
70(1) (6) of the Constitution which prevented pre-existing law from being 
held inconsistent with sections 57 to 68 of the Constitution. However, 
I submit that all this section achieves is to prevent pre-existing law from 
being scrutinised for consistency with the constitutionally protected 
rights. The death penalty for arson was added after the commencement 
of the Constitution and thus fell to be considered under the Constitution. 
The fact that the death penalty was a punishment alloted under the pre-
existing law is irrelevant to the consideration of whether section 60(3) 
saves punishments only to the extent to which they were previously 
stipulated for particular offences. 
Eve n adopting a literal approach to the sections it is not at all 
clear that the appellant's construction required a reading in of words. 
"Punish" in a statutory sense means to suffer for an offence. This 
necessarily imports the idea of a relationship between the offence and the 
penalty. However, their Lordships rejected American authorities which 
construed the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as 
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requiring a proportionate relationship between the offence and its 
sanction. There was, their Lordships stated, a manifest difference 
in wording. This American approach would lead the Court beyond a 
consideration of the words in their context; to questions of policy 
. d . . (78) in regar to punishment for crime. "Unless clearly so empowered 
or directed to rule as to the necessity or propriety of particular legis-
lation". 
(79) 
This they would not do. It was for the legislature to 
decide what was "necessary and desirable for the pruposes of maintaining 
(80) 
peace order and good government". 
It is clear from the judgment that their Lordships approach was 
concerned more with the sovereignty of the legislature. They expressly 
(81) 
approved a statement by Quenet A.C.L. in Gundu and Samba's Case 
that" 'once laws are validly enacted it is not for the Courts to 
adjudicate upon their wisdom, their appropriatness or the necessity for 
their existence.' " But this statement misses the point at issue. 
It was the very validity of the legislation under the Constitution that 
was questioned. If the enactment was ultra vires the Constitution then 
it had no validity. By stressing the power of the legislature to make 
laws for "maintaining peace, order and good government" the Committee 
appeared to ignore the important effect that a written constitution has 
upon the ambit of legislative power. 
By adhering to a literal interpretation of the Constitution, 
ignoring possible ambiguities in the wording, and displaying marked 
reluctance to venture into the area of policy the Committee reacted in 
favour of legislative encroachment on the fundamental rights granted in 
the Constitution. The fears expressed earlier seem manifest. 
Discouraging as this appears recent cases indicate a swing away 
from the treatment of constitutions as merely another statute. In 1977 
· f . h (82 ) h . · 1 d . in the case o Hinds v. Te Queen t e Privy Counci ma e important 
statements concerning the nature of constitutions and their interpretation. 
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The Parliament of Jamaica by the Gun Court Act of 1974 established a 
new Court, the Gun Court, to try "firearms offences". The Act 
provided for three divisions of the Court - (1) the Circuit Court 
Division, (2) the Resident Magistrate's Division, and (3) the 
Full Court Division. The Circuit Court and the Resident Magistrate's 
Divisions were presided over by a Supreme Court judge and a Magistrate 
respectively. 
magistrates. 
The Full Court Division was constituted by three resident 
The jurisdictions of the first two Divisions were that of a 
circuit court and of a Resident Magistrate respectively in relation to 
firearm offences and certain other offences but their geographical area 
of operation was extended to cover the whole island instead of being 
restricted to certain parishes. The Full Court Division's jurisdiction 
was, with the exception of capital offences, expressed to cover only 
firearm offences or other offences committed by a person detained for 
firearm offences and covered the whole island. Such a jurisdiction at the 
time the Constitution came into force had only been exercisable by a 
Supreme Court Judge in the Circuit Court. The Gun Court Act had not 
been passed by the special procedure prescribed in Section 49 of the 
Constitution for an Act of Parliament to alter provisions of the 
Constitution, nor did the Act contain any express amendment of the 
Constitution. 
Before deciding upon the constitutional validity of the Gun Court 
their Lordships first considered the problem at a more general level. 
Where the legislation under consideration does not come into direct 
conflict with the Constitution, it is necessary for the Court to seek 
the true character of the Act in order to ascertain whether it contravenes 
the express provisions or the implications of the Constitution. This was 
the approach adopted by the Privy Council who stated that "when the 
constitutional validity of an Act passed by the Parliament of Jamaica 
is in issue, the problem cannot be solved by the court's confining its 
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attention to the specific provisions of the Act that are directly applicable 
. (83) 
to the particular case." In order to decide whether the Act 
contravened the Constitution, the express and implied meaning of the 
Constitution must be established. 
Their Lordships had been referred in argument to a number of 
previous authorities dealing with constitutions granted to former 
colonial or protected territories of the Crown. While caution was 
necessary, particularly where the reasoning depended upon express words 
in particular constitutions, all these constitutions were similar in 
. (84) 
that they differed 
fundamentally in their nature from ordinary legislation 
passed by the Parliament of a sovereign state. They 
embody what is in substance an agreement reached between 
representatives of the various shades of political opinion 
in the State as to the structure of the organs of government 
through which the plentitude of the sovereign power of the 
State is to be exercised in future. 
The constitutions of the newly independent Commonwealth countries were 
negotiated and drafted by persons familiar with the basic concept of the 
separation of legislative, executive and judicial power. The successor 
institutions would therefore exercise powers of a similar character to 
those of the institutions they replaced. This statement, which forms the 
basis of their Lordships' judgment is interesting to say the least when 
you consider that the United Kingdom, and for that matter New Zealand 
systems of government do not adhere to the strict principles of separation 
of p owers as is evidenced in the American Constitution and flies directly 
in the face of the historical facts that in Colonial administration the 
Governor of the Colony was granted wide powers to administer, legislate 
· d' · 11 (8 s) and act JU icia y. 
Their Lordships then went on to hold that a necessary implication 
of the adoption of a structure which contains these three branches of the 
State, is that the basic principle of separation of powers will apply to 
the exercise of those powers. Thus a constitution would not normally 
contain any express mention of the principle. However, the absence of 
express words in constitutions of this nature does not prevent the 
powers of each branch being exercised exclusively by the legislature, 
. d h . d. . (86 ) executive an t e JU icature respectively: 
To seek to apply to constitutional instruments the 
canons of construction applicable to O!'.'dinary legislation 
in the fields of substantive criminal or civil law would, 
in their Lordships' view, be misleading - particularly 
those applicable to taxing statutes as to which it is a 
well established principle that express words are needed 
to impose a charge upon the subject. 
As a result a common pattern of drafting can be discerned in the 
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Constitutions of the newly independent Commonwealth countries which their 
Lordships described as "the Westminster model". 
Before examining the express provisions of the Jamaican Constitution 
their Lordships made some general observations about the interpretation 
of constitutions which follow that model. The Constitutions deal with 
the legislature executive and judiciary in separate Chapters. The 
provisions concerning the judiciary usually deal with appointment and 
security tenure the latter designed to give independence from the 
other two branches of government. What was implicit in the "Westminster 
model" is that : (
87
) 
judicial power, however it is to be distributed from time 
to time between various courts, is to continue to be 
vested in persons appointed to hold judicial office in the 
manner and on the terms laid down in the Chapter dealing with 
the judicature, even though not expressly stated in the 
Constitution: Liyanage v. The Queen (1967] 1 A.C.269,287-288. 
Where the constitutions include a Chapter dealing with fundamental 
rights and freedoms these provisions form part of the "substantive law 
of the State and until amended by whatever special procedure is laid 
down in the Constitution ... impose a fetter upon the exercise by the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary of the plentitude of their 
(88) 
respective powers." 
The remaining Chapters of the Constitution are concerned with the 
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technical details of who and how these powers should be exercised. 
Thus when the Constitution refers to a "court" in existence at the 
corrunencement of the Constitution the word is used collectively. Any 
express provisions in the Constitution for appointment or security 
of judges will apply to individual judges "subsequently appointed to 
exercise an analogous jurisdiction, whatever other name may be given 
1 I • • , (89) 
to the court in which they sit." Thus when considering whether a 
law conflicts with the constitution it is the substance of the law that 
must be noticed not its label. Their Lordships adopting the words of 
(90) 
Viscount Simonds in Attorney-General for Australia v. The Queen 
. (91) 
considered 
it would make a mockery of the Constitution if Parliament 
could transfer the jurisdiction previously exercisable by 
holders of the judicial offices named in Chapter II of the 
Constitution to holders of new judicial offices to which 
some different name was attached and to provide that persons 
holding the new judicial offices should not be appointed in 
the manner and upon the terns prescribed in Chapter VII for the 
appointment of members of the judicature. If this were the 
case there would be nothing to prevent Parliament from trans-
ferring the whole of the judicial power of Jamaica ... 
to bodies composed of persons, who not being members of the 
judicature, would not be entitled to the protection of 
Chapter VII at all. 
(92) 
This would have the important effect that 
the individual citizen could be deprived of the safeguard 
which the makers of the Constitution regarded as necessary 
of having important questions affecting his civil or criminal 
responsibilities determined by a court, however named, composed 
of judges whose independence from all local pressure by 
Parliament or by the executive was guaranteed by a security 
of tenure more absolute than that provided by the Constitution 
for judges of inferior courts. 
The Gun Court Act 1974 in attempting to establish the Full Court 
Division of the Gun Court purported to confer upon a court consisting 
of persons qualified and appointed as resident magistrates a jurisdiction 
which under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Constitution was 
only exercisable by a person qualified and appointed as a judge of the 
Supreme Court. The Constitution required that Supreme Court judges 
be appointed by the Governor-General on the recorrunendations of the 
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Judicial Service Corrunission. Judges of the Supreme Court are protected 
by entrenched provisions against Parliament passing ordinary laws 
(a) abolishing their office (b) reducing their salaries or (c) providing 
for an earlier end to their tenure. They may only be removed for 
disciplinary reason upon advice from the Judicial Corrunittee acting upon 
the recorrunendations of a tribunal of inquiry. 
In contrast the resident magistrate is not protected by such 
entrenched provisions and thus their conditions of service can be altered 
by an ordinary law. Consequently their independence is not completely 
assured. Dismissing an argument that Section 97(1) (
93 ) of the 
Constitution allowed Parliament by ordinary law to downgrade any part of 
the jurisdiction previously exercisable by the Supreme Court their 
Lordships rejected that part of the Gun Court Law which attempted to 
vest in a new court composed of members of the lower judiciary a 
jurisdiction that was a significant part of that exercised by the 
Jamaican Supreme Court when the Constitution came into force. 
The direction of Hinds is reinforced by two further Privy Counci; 
decisions. . 
. ff . . h (94 ) In Minister of Home A airs v. Fis er an appeal 
from the Bermudan Court of Appeala Jamaican mother of four illegitimate 
children all born in Jamaica married a Bermudan in 1972. The family 
took up residence with the husband in Bermuda in 1975. In 1976 the 
Minister of Labour and Irrunigration ordered the children to leave Bermuda. 
The mother and her husband applied to the Supreme Court to quash the order 
and for a declaration that the children were to be deemed to belong to 
Bermuda. The Supreme Court refused the declaration on the grounds that the 
children were illegitimate. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision 
and the Minister appealed to the Privy Council. The issue before their 
Lordships was whether the four children "belong to Bermuda "within the 
meaning of section 11 of the Constitution. 
Constitution of Bermuda provides : 
Section 11(5) of the 
(5) for the purposes of this section, a person shall be 
deemed to belong to Bermuda if that person -
(a) possesses Bermudian status, ... 
(c) is the wife of a person to whom either of 
the foregoing paragraphs of this subsection applies 
not living apart from such a person under a decree of 
a court or a deed of separation; or (d) is under 
the age of 18 years and is the child stepchild or 
child adopted in a manner recognised by law of a 
person to whom any of the foregoing paragraphs of this 
subsection applies. 
The question for decision then became whether the word "child" 
in section 11(5) (d) of the Constitution includes an illegitimate 
child. 
First their Lordships placed section 11(5) into its context. 
The Bermudan Constitution opens with Chapter I headed "Protection 
of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the individual". 
These fundamental rights and freedoms are stated as the right of 
every person and are subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of 
others. Section 11 was a provision dealing with freedom of movement 
which includes a right to enter and reside in Bermuda, but allows a 
restriction of this right in the case of any person who does not "belong 
to Bermuda". The function of Section 11(5) is to define those persons 
who "belong to Bermuda". In this context what is meant by the word 
"child"? 
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The appellants urged upon the Council the view that the Constitution 
was an Act of Parliament and that in all Acts of Parliament the word 
"child" prima facie means "legitimate child". To depart from this 
(95) 
meaning the object of the statute must warrant such a departure 
or the departure must arise by express words or necessary implication 




Neither of these tests, argued the appellants, 
Their Lordships rejected this line of reasoning and 
did so in two stages. 
First the Board maintained that all Acts of Parliament cannot be 
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classified on the same level. Acts of Parliament involving the use of 
"child" or "children" vary greatly in scope and purpose. The distinction 
between legitimate and illegitimate, especially in matrimonial law, 
has become less sharp and "requires the courts to consider, in each context 
in which the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate is sought to be 
d h th . th t 1 . 
. . . . ..( 98) ma ewe er in a context, po icy requires its recognition. 
But most importantly what was under consideration was a constitution, 
albeit brought into effect by an Act of Parliament. This document has 
special characteristics. 
1. It is drafted in a broad and general style. 2. The Chapter on 
fundamental Rights and Freedoms owes its origin to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms and the United Nations' 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Such origins call for "a generous 
interpretation avoiding what has been called 'the austerity of tabulated 
legalism', suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the 
fundamental rights and fre edoms referred to."(
99
) Thus, their Lordships 
asked whether the appellent's contention that the Constitution should be 
. (100) 
construed according to the rules applying to Acts of Parliament, was sound. 
This involved deciding between two possible answers. The first 
involved recognising the Constitution as an Act of Parliament, but treating 
it with more generosity than other Acts. The second required treating the 
Constitution ''as sui generis, calling for principles of interpretation 
of its own, suitable to its character as already described, without 
necessary acceptance of all the presumptions that are relevant to legislation 
. (101) 
of private law." Their Lordships preferred the second answer. 
In doing so they cautioned that this did not mean that no rules of law 
applied to the interpretation. "Respect must be paid to the language used 
(102) 
and to the traditions and usages which have given meaning to that language." 
But consistent with this was to take as a basic premise for the interpretation 
of the "character and origin of the instrument, and to be guided by the 
principle of giving full recognition and effect to those fundamental rights 
and freedoms with a statement of which the Constitution commences."( lOJ) 
As the rights and freedoms stated are those of "every person in 
Bermuda" the Council then considered whether matters of birth were 
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regarded as relevant when considering the permissible limitations upon these
 
rights. Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the use of "child" 
in its context was a clear recognition of the family unit and the need to 
maintain the unit as a whole. 
This recognition was fully in line with decisions on Article 8 of the 
European Convention recognising the family unit and the right to protection 
of an illegitimate child. Although the Court of Appeal based its decision 
upon a comparison of the wording of the Bermuda Immigration and Protection 
Act 1956, which referred in places specifically to legitimated or illegitima
te 
children, and the general use of "child" in Section 11(5) of the Constitutio
n, 
their Lordships preferred to base their decisions on the wider grounds 
outlined above. Their Lordships concluded by upholding the decisions
 
of the Court of Appeal. 
The views expressed by their Lordships have greater ramifications than 
. . . . ( 104) 
just their impact upon the particular issue in Fisher Their Lord
ships 
expressly referred to all "constitutional instruments drafted in the post-
colonial period, starting with the Constitution of Nigeria, and including 
, , , II (105) 
the Constitution of most Caribbean territories ... 
. (106) 
Finally, in Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor the Privy Council 
had to consider a claim whether a statutory rebuttable presumption of 
drug trafficking on being found in possession of more than 2 grammes of 
heroin conflicted with the "presumption of innocence". This was the
 
defendant's claimed, a fundamental right protected by the Constitution 
of the Republic of Singapore and found expression in Article 9(1) which 
provides 
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty save in accordance with law. 
and by article 12(1) which provides: 
all persons are equal before the law and entitled to the 
equal protection of the law. 
Their Lordships began by applying their earlier decision in Fisher 
and would give to Part IV of the Constitution of Singapore" 'a generous 
interpretation avoiding what has been called the austerity of tabulated 
legalism, suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the ]fundamental 
1 . . ] f d .,(107) iberties re erre to. Following this principle their Lordships 
rejected the contention of the Public Prosecutor that the requirements of 
Articles 9 and 12 are met if the deprivations of life or liberty complained 
of has been carried out under an Act passed by the Parliament of Singapore 
"however arbitrary or contrary to fundamental rules of natural justice the 
(108) 
provisions of such an Act may be." This argument was based on the 
fact that "written law" as defined in Article 2(1) meant "this Constitution 
and all Acts and Ordinances and subsidiary legislation for the time being in 
force in Singapore," and "law" is defined as including "written law." 
Their Lordships rejected this literalist approach, Article 4 of the 
Constitution provided that any law enacted after the commencement of the 
Constitution which was inconsistent with the Constitition, would be void. 
Turning to the Constitution, and categorising it as one founded on the 
Westminster model, their Lordships examined those articles which purport 
to assure individual citizens of protection of their fundamental rights 
and liberties. 
References to "law" in such articles refer to a system of law which 
"incorporates those fundamental rules of natural justice that had formed 
part and parcel of the common law of England that was in operation in 
. . ., (109) 
Singapore at the commencement of the Constitution. Thus it would 
have been taken for granted by the makers of the Constitution that "law" 
(llO) 
would embody these fundamental rules: 
If it were otherwise it would be a misuse of the language 
to speak of law as something which affords 'protection' 
for the individual in the enjoyment of his fundamental 
liberties, and the purported entrenchment of articles 9(1) 
and 12(1) would be little better than a mockery. 
However, their Lordships then went on to examine whether the 
statutory presumption of trafficking violated any of these fundamental 
rules. Although one of the fundamental rules of natural justice in the 
criminal field necessitated that a person could not be punished unless 
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it was established by an independent and unbiased tribunal that an offence 
had been conunitted, observance of the rule in Singapore did not mean 
adherence to technical rules of evidence and permitted methods of proof of 
facts exactly as they stood at the conunencement of the Constitution. These 
were a legacy from the English criminal law which may be inappropriate in 
Singapore. 
In their Lordship's view it was fanciful to suggest that a law 
containing a statutory presumption which operated once certain acts were 
proved, which were in themselves unlawful and consistent with the 
presumption, offended against some fundamental rule of natural justice. 
As such section 15 of the Drugs Act (which contained the presumption) 
could not be held inconsistent with the Constitution (as far as it related 
to proved possession). 
The defendants also claimed that the mandatory death sentence upon 
conviction for trafficking in more than 15 grammes of heroin was contrary 
to the constitution. This claim was based upon the belief that the 
mandatory nature of the sentence rendered it arbitrary because the Court 
could not discriminate in punishing offenders according to their 
individual blameworthiness. This then was not "in accordance with 
law." Alternatively the principle of equa.ity before the law was 
breached because the penalty was related to the amount of heroin in 
possession and not to individual culpability. 
Deferring to the judgment of the legislature their Lordships' 
stated that "in their judicial capacity they are in no way concern
ed 
with arguments for or against capital punishment whether there
 should 
be capital punishment in Singapore ... are questions for the legis
lature 
, , II (111) , , 
in Singapore... What their Lordships were concerned with w
as whether 
the imposition of the mandatory death penalty breached the constit
utional 
requirements of "equality before the law". This required that l
ike be 
compared with like. It prohibits laws which treat individuals
 within a 
single class more harshly than others but does not forbid discrim
ination 
in punitive treatment between one class of indivuals and another w
here 
there is some difference in the circumstances of the offence that 
has been 
committed. 
Questions of what is to comprise the dissimilarity in circumstance
s 




under the constitution which is based on separation of powers, 
there are questions which it is the function of the legislature 
to decide, not that of the judiciary. Provided that the factor 
which the legislature adopts as constituting the dissimilarity 
37 
in circumstances is not purely arbitrary but bears a reasonable 
relation to the social object of the law. There is no inconsiste
ncy 
with article 12(1) of the Constitution. 
Article 12(1) being concerned with equal punitive treatment for si
milar 
legal guilt has no application to a claim of equal punitive treatm
ent for 
equal moral blameworthiness. Consequently the 
mandatory death sentence 
was not unconstitutional. 
38 
CONCLUSION 
The decisions reviewed in this paper reveal that the early fears 
of a judiciary unable to cope with its new found role as arbiters of a 
written constitution have not been realised. 
This is not to say that the Privy Council has not at different times 
reacted conservatively as the early decision in Runowya amply demonstrates. 
However, the passage of time has found the Privy Council more confident in its 
pronuncements upon the nature of constitutions as Hinds and Fisher indicate, 
yet still able to strike a sensible note of caution against the "trivialis-
ation" of the important protection offered to citizens by Bills of Rights. 
It has often been the language of the particular constitutional article 
in question which has dictated the judiciary's response. The use of 
the "savings clause "and the limitations contained within fundamental rights 
provisions have meant that the judiciary do not have the freedom to create new 
rights as does the Supreme Court under the American Constitution. But the 
extension of protection to pre-constitution de facto rights and an 
expansive definition of "redress" in Maharaj have gone some way to 
ameliorate this. 
Although the Privy Council will defer where necessary to the will 
of the legislature as Ong Ah Chuan indicates; when faced with a blatant 
discriminatory Act such as in Akar or an overweening executive as in 
Reynolds, the reaction has been to protect the fundamental rights under 
threat even though this has meant a conflict with the Government of the day. 
These decisions and the decisions in Hinds and Fisher are more to be 
appreciated when it is remembered that the Commonwealth Governments could 
remove the right of appeal to the Privy Council at any time. It is also 
important to remember that in New Zealand there is no mechanism by which 
Acts of a sovereign legislature can be challenged as being in contravention 
of fundamental rights. 
This survey suggests that the Privy Council appear fully cognisant of 
the written constitution as the fundamental law, defining and legitimising 
39 
the organs of gcvernrnent and the exercise of power by these organs. 
Their Lordships have also demonstrated that they appreciate the 
role of the Constitution as "higher law" superior to the ordinary enacted 
laws of the legislature and the duty of the judiciary to protect the 
constitution and the fundamental rights contained therein . At the same 
time the Privy Council is aware of its own peculiar position and the need 
for restraint. It takes time to develop a public and political 
consciousness around a Constitution and these factors combined with the 
limitations imposed by the draftsmen have meant the decisions made 
may be characterised as cautious, but do represent a reasonable balance 
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APPENDIX 
Opinions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council concerning 
Commonwealth Bills of Rights 
Runyowa v . .!3_. [1967] 1 A.C. 26 freedom from inhuman or degrading 
punishment. 
Committee - Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Pearce and Lord Pearson 
(Southern Rhodesia). Delivered by Lord Morris. 
Oliver v. Buttigieg [1967] 1 A.C. 115 - freedom of expression. 
Committee - Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Pearce and Lord Pearson 
(Malta). Delivered by Lord Morris. 
D.P.P. v. Nasralla [1967] 2 A.C. 238 - freedom from double jecpardy. 
Committee Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Guest, Lord Devlin, Cord Upjohn 
and Lord Pearson (Jamaica). Delivered by Lord Devlin. 
King v . .!3_. [1969] 1 A.C. 304 - admissibility of evidence obtained in 
violation of a fundamental right. 
Committee Lord Hodson, Lord Upjohn and Lord Pearson (Jamaica). 
Delivered by Lord Hodson. 
Collymore v. A.G. [1970] A.C.538 - freedom of association and a right to 
a fair hearing. 
Committee - Lord Pearce, 
(Trinidad and Tobago). 
Lord Donovan, Lord Pearson and Sir Richard Wild 
Delivered by Lord Donovan. 
Akar v. A.G. of Sierra Leone [1970] A.C. 853 - freedom from discrimination 
on grounds of race. 
Committee - Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Hodson, Lord Guest, Lord 
Wilberforce and Sir Gordon Willmer (Sierra Leone). Delivered by Lord Morris. 
Jaundoo v. A.G. of Guyana [1971] A.C. 972 - right to property and procedural 
requirements. 
Committee - Lord Guest, 
Lord Diplock (Guyana). 
Lord Donovan, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Pearson and 
Delivered by Lord Diplock. 
Francis v. Chief of Police [1973] A.C. 761 - freedom of expression. 
Committee - Lord Wilberforce, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Pearson, Lord 
Kilbrandon and Lord Salmon. (St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla). 
Delivered by Lord Pearson. 
Baker v. R. [1975] A.C. 774 - freedom from retrospective increase in 
penalties. 
Committee - Lord Diplock, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Cross of Chelsea, 
Lord Salmon and Sir Thaddeus McCarthy. (Jamaica). Delivered by Lord Diplock. 
A.C. v. Antigua Times Ltd. [1976] A.C. 16 - freedom of expression and 
the imposition of licensing fees on newspaper companies. Questions of 
locus standi for non-natural persons. 
Committee - Lord Wilberforce, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Edmund-Davies, 
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, and Sir Thaddeus McCarthy. (Antigua). 
Delivered by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton. 
de Freitas v. Benny [1976] A.C. 23 (• - Legality of a mandatory death 
sentence. Ne ~.retroactivity of fundamental rights and freedoms in the 
Constitution. 
committee - Lord Diplock, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Viscount Dilhorne, 
Lord Kilbrandon and Lord Salmon. (Trinidad and Tobago). Delivered by 
Lord Diplock. 
Hinds v. R. [1977) A.C. 195 - Observations on the structure and 
implications of a written constitution. Constitutionality of a 
new court exercising jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but composed 
of members of the lower judiciary. 
Committee - Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, 
Lord Edmund-Davies and Lord Fraser of Tullybelton (Jamaica). 
Delivered by Lord Diplock. 
McBean v. R [1977) A.C. 537 - Whether proceedings in clambers before 
plea. Violated constitutional provisions requiring "all proceedings of 
every court" to be held in public. 
Committee - Lord Diplock, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Viscount Dilhorne, 
Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Cross of Chelsea. (Jamaica). 
Delivered by Viscount Dilhorne. 
Government of Malaysia v. Selangor Pilot Assoc. [1979) A.C. 337 -
Deprivation of property and compensation for compulsory acquisition. 
Committee - Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Wheatley, Lord Salmon, Lord Fraser 
of Tullybelton and Lord Russell of Killowen. (Malaysia). 
Delivered by Viscount Dilhorne. 
Maharaj v. A.G. of Trinidad and Tobago No. 2 [1979) A.C. 385 - Creation 
of a new remedy under the "redress" section of the constitution. Sowing 
of pre-existing law. Monetary compensation for infringement of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. 
Committee - Lord Diplock, Lord Hailsharn of St. Marylebone, Lord Salmon, 
Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Keith of Kinkel. (Trinidad and Tobago). 
Delivered by Lord Diplock. 
Abbot v. A.G. of Trinidad and Tobago [1979) 1 W.L.R. 1342 - Right to life 
and delay in execution of a death sentence. 
Committee - Lord Diplock, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Edmund-Davies 
and Lord Fraser of Tullybelton (Trinidad and Tobago). 
Delivered by Lord Diplock. 
Mootoo v. A.G. of Trinidad and Tobago [1979) 1 W.L.R.1334 - Unemployment 
levey - whether unauthorised exaction by legislature and void as being 
a charge imposed without due process of law. 
Committee - Lord Wilberforce, Lord Salmon, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, 
Lord Russell of Killowen and Sir William Douglas (Trinidad and Tobago). 
Delivered by Sir William Douglas. 
A.G. v. Ryan [1980) A.C. 718 - Constitutional right to registration as 
acitizen and legislation limiting that right. Construction of ordinary 
legislation that limited entrenched rights. 
Committee - Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Russell of Killowen, 
Lord Keith of Kindel and Sir Clifford Richmond (Bahamas). Delivered 
by Lord Diplock. 
Harrikisson v. A.G. of Trinidad and Tobago [1980) A.C. 265 - applications 
alleging contravention of human rights and freedoms, whether misconceived 
when other procedures for review available. 
Committee - Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord 
Russell of Killowen and Lord Scarman. (Trinidad and Tobago). Delivered 
by Lord Diplock. 
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] A.C.319. - Extension of Bermudan 
status to illegitimate children. Comments on construction of constitutions 
and differentiation from Acts of Parliament. 
Committee - Lord Wilberforce, Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, Lord Salmon, 
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton and Sir William Douglas (Bermuda). Delivered 
by Lord Wilberforce. 
Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 3 W.L.R. 855 - Drug trafficking, 
statutory rebuttable presumption of possession of more than 2 grammes of 
heroin presumed trafficking. 
Committee - Lord Diplock, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Scarman and Lord 
Roskill (Singapore). Delivered by Lord Diplock. 
Thornhill v. A.G. of Trinidad and Tobago [1980] 2 W.L.R. 510 - Police 
refusal to allow detainee to communicate with lawyer. Contraventions of 
human rights by police within the ambit of protection afforded by the 
Constitution. 
Committee - Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord 
Scarman and Lord Lane. (Trinidad and Tobago). 
Delivered by Lord Diplock. 
Stone v. R. [1980] 1 W.L.R. 880 - Whether right to trial by jury entrenched 
in constitution. 
Committee - Lord Diplock, Lord Salmon, Lord Elwyn-Jones, Lord Russell of 
Killowes and Lord Keith of Kinkel. (Jamaica). Delivered by Lord Diplock. 
Zainal bin Hashin v. Govt. of Malaysia [1980] A.C. 734 - Dismissal of police 
constable contrary to the Constitution, amendment to Constitution while 
appeal pending, validating the dismissal. 
Committee - Lord Wilberforce, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord 
Russell of Killowen and Lord Keith of Kinkel. (Malaysia). Delivered by 
Viscount Dilhorne. 
A.G. v. Reynolds [1980] A.C. 637 - Detention under emergency powers, 
whether the emergency powers regulations in conformity with the constitution. 
Validity of an Act purporting to take away a fundamental right passed 
without going through procedure prescribed in the Constitution. 
Committee - Lord Salmon, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Fraser of 
Tullybelton, Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Scarman. (St. Christopher, 
Nevis and Anguilla). Delivered by Lord Salmon. 
Chokolingo v. A.G. of Trinidad and Tobago [1981] 1,W.L.R. 106 - Whether 
imprisonment for contempt a deprivation of right to life, liberty security 
of person and property, without due process of law. 
Committee - Lord Diplock, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord 
Scarman and Lord Roskill. (Trinidad and Tobago). Delivered by Lord 
Diplock. 
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